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1Introduction 
This thesis is a collection of four articles, concerning the optimal management of renewable 
resources. The resources in question range in generality from generic theoretical natural 
capital, which also can be interpreted as environmental quality, to red deer in western 
Norway. The emphasis is on the exploitation of land-based resources; that is, domestic 
livestock or wildlife. In all papers a well-defined single managing unit is assumed, which is a 
rational profit maximizer with full information. The planning horizon is infinite, and all 
models are deterministic. Another common feature of the models presented here is that they 
all contain more than one state variable. In two of the papers the interaction between man-
made and natural capital is studied, while one paper studies the optimal control of a two-
species ecosystem and another is a stage structured analysis where the animal stock is divided 
into several age categories. While all of the articles are predominantly theoretical, three of the 
papers contain numerical simulations, and two of them with parameters values taken from 
empirical surveys. The dynamic nature of the models is emphasized, and analytical solutions 
and interpretation  of dynamic processes are provided.  
Chapter 1: On the optimal control of an animal-vegetation ecological system 
This paper studies the optimal management of a grazing system. The animal stock interacts 
with the vegetation in a predator-prey system, which is controlled by the harvesting of 
animals, and that is either globally stable or displays perpetually oscillating behavior when 
unexploited. The underlying assumption is that while vegetation growth follows a logistic 
growth relationship, growth in the animal stock is density independent. This distinguishes the 
model from other contributions on optimal pastoral livestock management (e.g. Perrings, 
1997). It is shown however, that a simle harvesting rule may lead to stability.
The managing unit maximizes discounted profits over an infinite planning horizon. Income 
derives from meat production, and costs are associated with stock maintenance only. Both 
optimal steady states, with comparative statics, and the optimal approach path is characterized 
analytically. It is shown that an increase in the meat price gives a larger optimal steady stae 
animal stock. A change in the discount rate, on the other hand, is shown to have an ambiguous 
impact on the optimal herd size, at least for small discount rates. This leads to the paradoxical 
situation that a higher discount rate may give a higher current value profit in the steady state. 
The optimal approach path is shown to exhibit a combination of singular and bang-bang 
control, where the singular trajectory is a saddle path in state-state space.  
2The model is illustrated with a numerical analysis, where it is found that the optimal harvest 
program, which can be approximated by a constant grazing pressure policy, represents a 
considerably increase in discounted profit, compared to a constant harvest rate policy. The 
paper concludes with a discussion of  a concave positive stock effect, where the intrinsic 
value of livestock is taken into account. It is found that this effect leads to a larger herd in 
optimum, that a price increase now works in the direction of a smaller animal stock, and that 
the stability properties of the optimal solution and the effect of discounting is not qualitatively 
different from the baseline model.    
Chapter 2: Optimal exploitation of a renewable resource with capital limitations.
The second paper studies the optimal management of a renewable resource, with man-made 
capital requirements. Interaction between natural and man-made capital is treated in the 
neoclassical growth literature and in the literature on Hartwicks rule, in the context of non-
renewable resource management. (Dasgupta and Heal, 1974; Hartwick, 1977; Asheim et.al., 
2003). Within that strand of literature, emphasis is on the optimal transition from a resource 
dependent to a non-resource dependent economy. With a renewable resource, on the other 
hand, the focus is on optimal steady states where both stocks are co-existing. There has been 
seminal contributions within the fisheries literature on this issue (in particular, Clark et. al., 
1979), but none that we are aware of, where the renewable resource is a domestic animal 
stock. The differences are important: in domestic livestock management the capital stock does 
not contribute to the harvesting process, but instead to keeping the animals, in our example 
through the winter time. Such capital requirements may also be present in e.g. rangeland 
management and fish farming. We assume not only that the harvesting cost is stock 
independent, but also that the growth rate of the animal stock is exogenous, and hence assume 
away any density dependence. The implied linearity of the model, along with pure profit 
maximization, yields a model that is analytically tractable. Both the optimal steady state and 
transition paths are analyzed. The paper concludes with a numerical example that is related to 
sheep farming in Northern Scandinavia. 
The comparative static analysis, where both situations where the equilibrium is interior and 
where the steady is constrained by the maximum annual investment, shows that changes in the 
meat price and the discount rate have expected effects on the optimal steady state animal and 
capital stock; a higher meat price leads to larger steady state stocks, while increasing the 
discount rate yields the opposite effect. For the dynamic workings of the model, the 
3assumption of irreversibility in both stocks is crucial; live animals cannot be bought at the 
market and capital cannot be sold. It is found that the approach path towards the optimal 
steady state is a combination of bang-bang and singular controls, where in general one of the 
two controls, harvest of the animal stock and investment in produced capital, is interior along 
the approach path close to the equilibrium. In contrast to the typical fishery model, the capital 
stock will never overshoot the steady state, but may undershoot the equilibrium when the 
initial animal stock is small. The animal stock may both undershoot and overshoot the steady 
state, depending on the initial capital stock. 
Chapter 3: Balancing income and cost in red deer management 
This paper presents a bioeconomic analysis of a red deer population within a Norwegian 
institutional context. The population is managed by a well-defined managing unit, typically 
consisting of many landowners cooperating to maximize the present-value income from 
hunting. Hunting income consists only of profits from selling the meat, net of grazing damage 
costs, in the baseline scenario, while the effect of including the recreational aspect of hunting 
is analyzed subsequently. The red deer population is structured in five categories; calves, 
female and male yearlings, adult females and adult males. The different ways to compose the 
harvest across age and sex categories and the implied economic benefits are highlighted. A 
numerical analysis, with parameter values from a Norwegian deer population survey, shows 
results with respect to the optimal harvest composition, and the effects of parameter changes 
and constraints. 
In the baseline case where the recreational value is excluded, we find that only adult males are 
harvested extensively. The females and calves are harvested moderately, and calves are 
harvested only due to the imposed code of conduct restriction whereby the number of calves 
harvested must be equal to or higher than the number of adult females harvested. There is no 
harvest of yearlings. This harvest pattern is found to persist when the price of meat goes up 
and when the grazing damage is ignored by the landowner, although the impact on total 
population size and economic benefits of these changes are substantial. Relaxing the code of 
conduct constraint leads to a moderate increase in the harvest rate of adult females, while no 
calves are harvested. The effect of replacing the optimal harvest composition by a uniform 
harvest pattern across all categories is shown to be very large, leading to a considerable 
decrease in net economic benefit.  
4Without any restrictions on the harvest, and ignoring the recreational aspect of the hunting, 
we find that the ‘biological discounted’ values, defined as the ration between the per animal 
meat value (marginal gain) and the survival rate (marginal loss) for the various categories of 
animals are instrumental in determining the optimal harvesting composition, without fertility 
playing any direct role. This seems to be a general result in stage structured models where 
harvest value is maximized, a result obtained first in the classical Reed (1980) fishery article, 
see also Tahvonen (2008).  
The optimal adjustment path towards the optimal steady state harvest regime is shown to 
display a typical bang-bang approach where each category is controlled so as to approach the 
optimal steady state as rapidly as possible. However, when the recreational hunting value is 
included in the objective function, we find that the optimal harvesting scheme involved 
oscillating harvest rates. This result is not a new one within the resource management 
literature (see, e.g. Clark, 1990), and is in this model a consequence of the objective function 
being no longer concave in the harvest. 
Chapter 4: Sustainable production and the ambiguous effect of discounting 
It is generally acknowledged that a high discount rate implies low levels of man made capital 
and also a deteriorated environment in the long run. The impact of discounting has been 
discussed in the sustainable production literature, involving both produced capital and 
renewable resources, see e.g. by Beltratti et. Al. (1995). Moreover, within the climate change 
literature, discounting has been heavily debated; a good summary of the different aspects of 
this debate is provided by Dasgupta (2008). He is, among other thing, concerned about the 
lack of sensitivity analysis with respect to the impact of discounting in the various integrated 
assessment models (e.g. Nordhaus, 1994). However, discounting can have surprising effects 
when more than one state variable is taken into account, something that is not heavily 
emphasized in this literature.  
The aim of this paper is to explore whether discounting can have surprising effects in a 
theoretical model of production with two inputs; natural and man-made capital. Natural 
capital can be interpreted as a generic renewable resource, or as environmental quality. The 
model is deterministic, and growth in population and technology is abstracted from 
throughout the analysis. The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, consumption of 
the produced composite is the only control variable, whereas resource extraction, or 
5emissions, is a constant fraction of output. It is shown that either one of the two stock may 
increse with discounting, for moderate discount rates. Under the assumption that there is a 
one-to one-relationship between the two stocks across optimal steady states, this implies the 
existence of paradoxical conumption behavior, where instanteneous stedy state utility 
increases with discounting for a range of discount rates. In this  situation, excess patience 
leads to overinvestment and too high economic activity in the medium run. The impatioent 
society may be better off in the long run.  
In the second part of the paper, a model is presented where also abatement effort is taken into 
account as a second control variable. As there is no longer a one-to-one relationship between 
the two stocks across steady states, the conditions for paradoxical steady states to occur now 
becomes more difficult to identify. It is shown however, that with the most common 
production functions, both assets decrease with discounting. However, when utility depends 
also on environemental quality, there is a possibility that the environmental quality may 
increase with discounting also with CES production, as the environment is now a consumer 
good. Letting also emissions into the utility function complicates the picture further, and the 
relationship between discounting and future becomes increasingly model specific.  
Discussion
There are several aspects that link together the four papers in this thesis. Obviously, they are 
all dealing with renewable resource management problems. The three first essays here 
concern land-based resources; domestic livestock management, semi-domestic herding 
practice and wildlifde hunting activity. The largest bulk of literature on renewable resource 
management has been produced within the economics of fisheries, and the managment of 
terrestrial animal species has not attracted nearly as much attention within the economics 
literature. Aspects that pertain mainly to terrestrial animal management that are particularly 
important in the articles presented here include the following. For one, domestic animal 
stocks, as opposed to wildlife and marine fish stocks, require maintenance. Both land and 
labour, and to some extent capital structures such as fencing and buildings, are involved in the 
maintenance process, which all have an opportuity cost. Hence, operating costs are mainly 
associated with stock size, and not with harvesting in the models presented here. Another 
property of domestic animal stocks is that growth is not density dependent, something which 
affects the dynamic workings of the models. Wildlife, on the other hand, is generally density 
dependent and may not require extensive maintenance, thus being more reminiscent of the 
6marine fisheries from a modeling perspective. However, wildlife management may often 
stand in conflict with alternative land use such as agriculture and other types of human 
activity. Crop damage, vehicle collisions and other types of nuisance represent possible costs 
here, that are related to stock size and may, moreover, be of a public nature.
In addition, terrestrial animal species typically have functions aside from being mere 
providers of meat. The intrinsic value of an animal stock derives from various sources, such 
as alternative uses of the animals (to confine pests, conserve the cultural landscape, provide 
means of transport, etc), pure amenity value, leisure activities such as horse riding and 
wildlife viewing, etc., which are related to the standing stock, and not to harvest. These 
positive stock effects may be of a privat type, i.e. as a source of social status in the local 
comminity, but also public, such as the preservation of bidiversity. An early contribution on 
the topic is the theoretical analysis of ’wealth effects’ in a neoclassical growth model by Kurtz 
(1968). Intrinsic stock values in the context of terrestrial animal resources was introduced by 
Schulz and Skonhoft (1996). Subsequently, the idea of natural resources having a value of its 
own has worked its way into the literature. Overviews are provided by Barbier and Swanson 
(1992), and van Kooten and Bulte (2000). 
From a technical perspective, the absence of density dependence among domestic animal 
stocks introduces linearity into the models, something which may simplify the analysis, but 
also lead to interesting dynamic developments; both effects of which are represented in the 
papers included here. Another notable result is that, when operating costs are mainly related 
to stock size, the size of the steady state animal stock, as well as the amount of inputs required 
in the operation process, generally increases with the price of meat. The effect of discouting, 
will generally not be qualitatively different from established insights, however, as an increase 
in the discount rate gives a more agressive harvesting regime and hence a smaller steady state 
animal stock. As is shown e.g. in the present thesis however, when several state variable 
interact this established insight may be subject to revision. 
Another common feature of the models presented here are that they are all multi-dimensional. 
Analytical work on resource problems with several state variables is scarce, for good reason. 
It is often impossible to obtain insights form mulit-dimentional models that are general, and 
not specific to the model at hand. Nevertheless, analytical insights are emphasized in these 
papers, and do to a certain extent appear to have an intuitive economic interpretation. Some 
7are surprising, such as the complicated role of discounting, other are more familiar. Dynamic 
issues become particularly intereseting in multidimentional models, and attempts have been 
made to analyze optimal approach paths explicitly and to focus on stability problems. Given 
that multi-dimentional systems are ubiquitous in nature, it is conceivable that these models 
may have applications beyond the particular cases studied here. 
To keep the models tractable however, something must be sacrificed. Of the many aspects 
that are not treated in this thesis, two seem worth mentioning in particular. First, there is no 
strategic interaction in none of the models; the only actor present is a single fully informed 
profit maximizer. This might be reasonable in the case of a single price taking sheep farmer, 
but for the whole reindeer business in Northern Scandinavia this is clearly an unsatisfactory 
assumption. Without doubt, strategic behaviour would have to be included to give a realistic 
picture of the current situation here. Second, the omission of stochastic factors are an obvious 
neglect in any model of the natural environment. The consequences of increases uncertainty 
for the optimal management policy would be of great interest  in all  of the models here, 
which may be a good starting point for further reserarch. 
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Trondheim, Norway 
Abstract
A model of interaction between a renewable natural resource with capital limitations, as 
exemplified by the optimal investment problem of sheep farming in a Nordic context, is 
analyzed. The model builds on existing studies from the fisheries literature, but the important 
difference is that while capital is related to harvesting effort in the fisheries, capital attributes 
to production capacity to keep the animal stock during the winter in our farm model. The 
paper provides several results where both optimal steady states and the optimal approach 
paths are characterized analytically. The results are further supported by a numerical example. 
Keywords:  
Livestock management, Irreversible investment, Sheep farming, Optimal control, Singular 
solutions.   
2

1.Introduction
Following the pioneering work of Smith (1968), economic models of renewable resource 
management have occasionally been extended to include investment in man-made capital. 
Even though most, if not all, contributions to this strand of literature have been related to 
fishery management problems, spurred by the seminal contribution of Clark et al. (1979), 
much of the conclusions obtained here can probably quite easily be extended into the 
management of other types of wild natural resources, like terrestrial wildlife. In this paper, we 
look at another type of renewable management problem with capital limitations, namely 
domestic livestock management. The important difference is that while capital determines the 
fishing effort in the fishery problem, capital is related to the capacity to keeping animals 
during the indoors winter season in our farm problem, which is exemplified by sheep farming 
in a Nordic context. 
The literature on the management of what may be viewed as two capital stocks, one man-
made and the other one biological, is quite small. Clark et al. (1979) emphasized the 
irreversibility of investment, meaning that man-made capital cannot be sold once having been 
bought, and they showed how the possible approach paths towards the optimal steady state is 
greatly affected by this property. Their model is linear in both controls, investment in fishing 
vessels and harvest of the fish stock, and the approach paths are therefore characterized by a 
combination of bang-bang and singular controls. Stochastic elements are included in a paper 
by Charles and Munro (1985), and McKelvey (1985) analyzes open access dynamics in a 
fishery with man-made capital. Boyce (1995) formulates a similar model to that of Clark et al. 
(1976), but with non-linear investment costs. He finds, not surprisingly, that the derived 
optimal approach path is no longer of the bang-bang type. Sandal et al. (2007) extend the 
literature with a model without any non-negative constraint on investment, but where capital 
is less valuable when sold than when bought.
In this paper we analyze the optimal investment and harvest, or stocking, decision problem of 
a sheep farmer. The farmer, assumed to be well-informed and rational, aims to maximize 
present-value profit generated by meat production. The market price of meat is taken as given, 
as we consider a single farm, and abstract from both exogenous price fluctuations and (other) 
stochastic factors such as climatic variations. In addition to the natural capital stock, the 
animals, the farmer must also hold a certain amount of man-made capital which adheres to the 
3
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familiar mechanisms of investment and depreciation, to keep the animals indoors during the 
winter season. Man-made capital in this farming system is thus mainly buildings and related 
equipment which is instrumental in determining farm capacity. We are not aware of other 
theoretic domestic livestock management models that include man-made capital in addition to 
animal capital, even though capital theoretical treatments of livestock are frequently found 
within the resource economics literature, see e.g. Kennedy (1986). Farm models include 
Jarvis (1974) who formulated a timing problem of cattle grazing, and Skonhoft (2008) who 
analyzed the optimal stocking problem of Nordic sheep farming. Our model and reasoning 
builds to some extent on this last paper, but Skonhoft studied a situation with no man-made 
capital limitations and with different year classes of the animal capital. Different year classes 
are not included in the present paper. The research problem here is to find the optimal 
slaughtering and investment policy in such a Nordic farming system, and to characterize both 
the optimal steady state and approach paths.. In the subsequent analysis, natural and man-
made capital will generally be referred to merely as ‘animals’ and ‘capital’, respectively. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes briefly the Nordic sheep 
farming system and the model is formulated. Section 3 describes the optimal solution to the 
model while we in section 4 proceed to analyze the steady states. Having identified the 
optimal steady states, we analyze in section 5 the approach path and show that it involves a 
combination of bang-bang and singular controls. Numerical simulations are shown in section 
6, while section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Model
The following analysis is related to economic and ecological conditions found in Norway, but 
these also exist in Iceland and Greenland. There are about 2.1 million sheep in Norway during 
the summer grazing season, divided among some 16,000 family farms. The average farm size 
is therefore quite small and accounts only for about 130 animals. Sheep farms are located 
either close to mountain areas and other sparsely populated areas or along the coast, with a 
means to transport the animals to more distant alpine areas with access to areas of summer 
grazing land. Such land is typically communally owned and managed. There is a sharp 
distinction between the summer grazing season and the winter indoors season. While food is 
abundant during the summer grazing season, housing and indoor feeding is required 
throughout winter because of snow and harsh weather conditions. The indoors winter season 
is typically from mid-October to the beginning of May next year. The adult sheep and the 
4
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newborn lambs are then released for outdoors grazing. In September- October slaughtering 
takes place. In Norway, winter feeding basically consists of hay grown on pastures close to 
farms, with the addition of concentrate pellets provided by the industry. The main product is 
meat, which accounts for about 80% of the average farmer’s income. The remainder comes 
from wool, because sheep milk production is virtually nonexistent (Nersten et al. 2003). 
However, the income from wool is neglected in the following analysis.
We begin with formulating the animal growth equation, given in discrete time, and where 
additions to the stock occur once a year (in the spring), as does the harvest of animals (in the 
fall). As our main focus is on the interaction between biological and man-made capital, we do 
not distinguish between different age classes of animals (but see Skonhoft 2008), but consider 
a biomass model where ‘a sheep is a sheep’. The rate of growth in animal biomass is further 
assumed constant, as is reasonable with a domestic animal stock facing controlled breeding 
and maintenance; that is, there is no density dependent growth process. The growth function 
for animal biomass is thus given as:  
(1) 1 ,t t t tX X rX H   
where tX  is the animal stock size at time (year) t , tH  is harvest and 0r !  is the animal stock 
growth rate, assumed to be constant. A feature of Scandinavian sheep farming is that live 
animal are generally not traded. Therefore, we do not consider the possibility of restocking 
and require 0tH t .
Man-made capital, also assumed to be homogenous, is used as housing for the animal stock 
during the winter indoors season. Each year, a constant positive amount of investment is 
allowed, and a constant fraction of the capital stock depreciates due to wear and tear. The net 
capital growth is thus given by: 
(2) 1 ,t t t tK K K IJ    
where tK  is the capital stock and tI  is the accompanying (gross) investment. 0J ! is the rate 
of depreciation, assumed to be fixed. 
The revenue of the farmer is made up of income from meat production. With 0p ! as the   
slaughtering price (net of slaughtering costs), the current meat income for the farmer simply 
reads tpH and is included as the first term in the profit equation:  
5
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(3)      , , , ,t t t t t t t t tH X K I pH V X Q X K cI3     .
p is assumed fixed over time and independent of the harvest decision, as explained above 
(section 1).
We then have the cost side, where we first describe at the operating cost. The operating cost 
structure differs sharply between the outdoor grazing season and the indoor feeding season. 
As explained, during the grazing period the sheep may graze on communally owned lands 
(‘commons’) or private land. Within the Nordic sheep farming system, such land may be 
available cost free, or the farmer may pay a fixed annual rent (Austrheim et al. 2008). The 
variable cost is hence simply assumed to be the indoor season operating cost. These costs, 
which include labor cost (typically as an opportunity cost), electricity and veterinary costs in 
addition to fodder, are assumed to determined uniquely by the size of the animal stock, i.e., 
( )t tV V X , and with ' 0V ! , '' 0V ! , and (0) 0V  . The argument for a strictly convex cost 
function is that fodder production is constrained by the size of the available land; that is, as 
the stock becomes larger it becomes progressively more costly to provide fodder.  
As mentioned, in contrast to what is found in the fisheries literature where capital normally is 
equivalent to harvesting effort (e.g., Clark et al. 1979), capital in our farm system is housing 
and related equipment to keep the animal stock during the winter. We assume that there is no 
absolute constraint on the amount of animals that a given amount of capital can support, so 
that there is no such thing as 'full' capacity utilization in our farm model. However, as the 
indoor space per animal diminishes, the operating procedure becomes increasingly 
cumbersome. We hence include the capacity utilization cost, or congestion cost, function 
 ,t tQ X K in our current profit equation (3). It increases with the number of animals, for any 
given amount of capital, such that 0xQ !  and 0xxQ ! , together with 0KQ  , 0KKQ ! and
0KXQ  . In addition, we have  0, 0tQ K  when 0tK ! and 0lim ( , )t t tK Q X Ko  f for 0tX ! .
For all positive stock values this function is hence convex in tX and tK . In the numerical 
section 6 below we specify this cost function. 
The final cost component is the cost of buying new capital equipment. We assume that there 
is a constraint on the size of investment in each period, due to, say, limited access to credit, 
such that maxtI Id . The cost per unit of investment is fixed and given by 0c ! , so that the 
6
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yearly investment cost reads tcI . An alternative assumption, following e.g. Sandal et al. 
(2007) , could have been to introduce adjustment costs to limit the amount of investment 
carried out in each time period. In our model, as in reality, investment is also irreversible; the 
buildings cannot be sold once having been set up; that is, 0tI t .
3. Optimal management 
The farmer aims to maximize present-value profit subject to the dynamic constraints imposed 
by the growth equations for animals (1) and capital (2), and the constraints on harvest and 
investment in each period. We suppose an infinite planning horizon, meaning that we are 
looking for an optimal steady state. The planning problem of the farmer is then formulated as:  
(4)         
   
0
0
1
0
1
,
. .
0 , 0
, 0
,  given
t
t t t
t
t t
t t
m
t t
ax
t t
t t
t t
t t
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

f
 
­ ½  ª º® ¾¬ ¼¯ ¿
  
  
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and where 1/ (1 )U G   is the discount factor with 0G t  as the constant discount rate. 
 
The Lagrangean of this problem may be written as: 
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where tO  and tP  are the shadow prices of the animal and capital stock, respectively. The 
necessary conditions for a maximum are: 
(5) 1 0, 0t t
t
L p H
H
UO w   d dw
(6) max1 0, 0t t
t
L c I I
I
UP  !d
w    d dw
(7)  1' 1 0X t t
t
Q rL V
X
UO Ow        w
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(8)  1 1 0K t t
t
L Q
K
UP J P  w    w
These conditions are also sufficient if the Lagrangean is concave in the states and controls 
jointly. Since the Lagrangean is linear in the controls, the sufficiency conditions boil down to 
 '' 0, 0X X X X K K K KL V Q L Qd    d and  2 2 0X X QQ Y K KX X X K XL L Q QL Q V  cc t ,
which are satisfied for the given properties of the cost functions. The transversality conditions 
for the infinite horizon problem must also hold; i.e.,  * 0t ttlim X XOof  t and 
 * 0t ttlim K KPof  t and where the asterisk indicates optimal steady state values. 
The interpretation of (5) is that harvest is set to zero whenever the price of meat is lower than 
the discounted shadow price of the animal stock, and positive otherwise. Similarly, (6) states 
that there will be positive investment only when the unit investment cost is lower than the 
discounted shadow price of capital. It can be set to its maximum value, or it can be set to the 
interior of the control region. This ’singular’ control policy is only implicitly defined from the 
first order conditions. We thus have the following alternatives for harvest policy, letting SH
denote singular harvest: 
1
1
1
( )
0
t
t
S
t
t
when p impulse harvest
H H when p
when p
O
UO
U
UO



!­°  ®° ¯
f
Note that, since there is no upper bound on harvest except from the size of the stock itself, 
whenever 1tp UO ! , the herd will be reduced immediately (that is, within one time period), to 
the level where 1tp UO  , and singular harvest takes over. This is often called impulse control 
in the optimal control theory literature.  
As for investment, we get: 
1
1
10
t
t
t
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I when c
I I when c
when c
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


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Therefore, investment will be at its maximum or minimum level whenever the per unit 
investment cost is lower or higher than the shadow price of capital. When the shadow price 
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reaches the point where it equals the present value of the unit cost of investment, the control 
will either switch between the two control boundaries – going from maximum to zero 
investment, or vice versa - or stay at singular investment for some amount of time.  
Singular control relationships for both stocks can be further derived from the first order 
conditions.  If singular harvest holds, we have from equation (5) 1tp UO  , which means that 
the shadow price of the animal stock is constant, and equalizes * /pO U . When inserted into 
condition (7), we find the following golden rule condition for the animal stock: 
(9)   '( ) ( , )Xr X Kp Q XVG   
Equation (9) therefore describes the relationship between X  and K  that is consistent with 
singular harvest. This condition may also be written as 
> @(1/ ) '( ) ( , )Xp pr V X Q X KG   indicating that the market revenue from selling one animal 
should equalize the discounted net benefit from keeping it. Because both 'V and XQ are
positive, we must require that the animal growth rate exceeds the discount rate, r G! , which 
is a well-known condition for a positive steady state animal stock (see, e.g., Clark 1990). As 
both r  and G  are constant this must always hold, also outside the steady state. 
With singular investment, we have from (6) 1tc UP  , which means that the capital shadow 
price is constant, * /cP U . Inserted into equation (8) gives the golden rule condition for 
capital:
(10)   ( , )Kc Q X KJ G   .
Equation (10) defines a relationship between X and K that is consistent with singular 
investment. It may also be written as ( , )(1/ )[ ]Kc Q X KG J   indicating that the unit 
investment cost should equalize the discounted marginal net benefit from holding capital.  
4. The steady states 
In an interior equilibrium where both  * * *,SH H K X  and  * * *,SI I K X , the golden rule 
conditions (9) as well as (10) must hold. But in principle, one, or both, controls may also be 
set at a boundary at a steady state. From equation (1), however, as long as the rate of animal 
growth is positive and constant, the harvest rate must be positive in the steady state. Since 
there is no upper constraint on harvest, the steady state harvest policy must then be singular. 
9

From equation (2), steady state investment must also be positive, but may be set to its 
maximum level, where the gross investment in each year equals depreciation, keeping the 
capital stock at its optimal steady state level given the investment constraint. We therefore 
have two alternatives for the steady state, and this is stated as: 
Result 1. There are two steady state alternatives. The first is interior where both controls are 
singular. In the second harvest is singular while investment is at the maximum level.  
We first study the interior steady state in some detail and then discuss the situation where the 
investment constraint binds. At an interior steady state, the two schedules defined by 
equations (9) and (10) must intersect. Except from the very special case where the two curves 
are coinciding, there can be at most a countable number of equilibria. When differentiating (9) 
and (10) we find / / ( '' ) 0XK XXdX dK Q V Q   ! and / / 0KK XKdX dK Q Q  ! , respectively. 
Therefore, both schedules (9) and (10) slope upwards in the  ,K X -space, but the curvatures 
cannot be determined generally without imposing restrictions on third derivatives. This allows 
for an arbitrary number of intersection points, with a correspondingly arbitrary number of 
stable and unstable equilibria. However, we find a stable steady state *K and *X where the 
optimal harvest condition (9) intersects the singular investment schedule (10) from above, so 
that / ( '' ) /XK XX KK XKQ V Q Q Q  !  holds at the intersection point. Otherwise, the intersection 
point is an unstable equilibrium. This holds because a local maximum is found where the 
Lagrangean is concave around a stationary point which requires that the condition 
  2 ( , )' 0' KK KX X X XV Q Q Q K * t  must be satisfied. Rearranging this expression 
gives / ( ) /XK XX XX KK XKQ V Q Q Q  !   as claimed. When these equilibria are found, the steady 
state harvest follows from (1) as: 
(11)   * *H rX ,
and the steady state investment from (2) as:  
(12)  * *I KJ .
Equations (9) and (10) and the sufficiency condition can be used to derive some comparative 
static results about *X and *K . In a next step, the effects on *H and *I follow recursively 
from equations (11) and (12), respectively. We first look at the effect of a changing meat price 
and when differentiating (9) and (10) we find    X XX Kr p Q dX Q dKd VG  cc  and 
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0 K K K XdKQ Q dX  , respectively. Combing these expressions yields the partial price 
effects    * / ,/ 0KKX p Q r X KGw *w   ! and    * // 0,KXK p XQ r KG *w w    ! . This is 
stated as:    
Result 2. An increase in the price of meat will result in a larger stock of animals and man-
made capital in an interior optimal steady state. 
This result is the opposite of what is found in the standard fishery model (e.g., Clark 1990) 
where a price increase leads to more aggressive harvest and a lower optimal steady state 
stock. The reason for the opposite result in our farm model is that costs here are not associated 
with harvest, but with stock maintenance. With a higher meat price, the farmer thus finds it 
beneficial to keep a higher stock of both types of capital as the relative maintenance costs 
decreases. Differentiating (9) and (10) also gives information about the effects of a change in 
the discount rate. We find positive effects for both stocks, and this is stated as: 
Result 3.An increase in the discount rate leads to reduced stocks of both animals and capital 
in the interior optimal steady state. 
This result fits conventional economic intuition, but is far from obvious when more than one 
capital stock is considered and cannot be deduced form the golden rule conditions directly. As 
shown by e.g. Asheim (2008), paradoxical effects of discounting, such as a positive 
relationship between discounting and steady state consumption, may result from multi-
dimensional models. Also, when there is a trade-off between the two stocks across alternative 
steady states, something that is typical for predator-prey models, one of the stocks must 
increase with discounting while the other goes down. However, this does not happen here. 
Following the same procedure with respect to the other parameters, all the time assuming that 
the sufficiency conditions are fulfilled, the other comparative static results can also be 
computed. All results are reported in Table I where the investment and harvest effects are 
included as well. An increase in the investments cost or depreciation rate means that it is 
beneficial for the farmer to reduce the steady state animal and man-made capital stocks, 
whereas an increase in the growth rate of animals leads to larger optimal stocks of both 
animals and capital. These results are more or less as expected, and the effects of the 
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parameters work in the same direction for both stocks. It can also be confirmed that we find 
the combined effects * ** / 0/ /X r d XX J Gw ww  w !w , indicating that the negative effect on 
the animal stock of higher depreciation rate must be smaller than the negative effect of higher 
discount rate. We also find * ** / 0/ /K r d KK J Gw ww  w !w , indicating the same different 
effects on the optimal steady state capital stock. 
The effects on the control variables through equations (11) and (12) are quite straightforward, 
except for the animal growth rate and rate of depreciation which both have direct and indirect 
effects on the steady state harvest and investment, respectively. For a positive shift in the 
animal growth rate, the two effects work in the same direction and lead to higher harvest in 
the steady state, since from (11) * * */ / 0H r X r X rw w   w w ! . With the depreciation rate, 
however, the two effects work in the opposite direction as we find 
* * * // KI KJ J Jw w   w w from equation (12). The direct effect is to increase the required 
amount of investment to maintain a given amount of capital, whereas the indirect effect is to 
decrease the optimal steady state capital stock. The overall effect is ambiguous with general 
functional forms. 
[Table I about here] 
We then consider the other steady state possibility where the investment is no longer singular, 
and hence the condition 
(13) * max SI I I 
replaces equation (12) in the interior steady state solution. The steady state capital stock now 
follows directly through (12) as * /maxK I J  , which inserted into equation (9) yields the 
steady state animal stock. The amount of capital will now for obvious reasons be below what 
was found in the interior steady state. Because condition (9) yields a positive relationship 
between the two stocks, the number of animals will also be below what was found in the 
interior steady state. The steady state harvest again follows from equation (11) as * *H rX ,
and the number of animals slaughtered will consequently also be below the previous steady 
state.  
The comparative static results are now somewhat different, as indicated with brackets in 
Table I. When the investment constraint binds, the only factor that affects the steady state 
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capital stock is the depreciation rate. The sign of the effects on the animal stock are as before, 
except for the investment cost which now has zero effect.  
5. Optimal approach paths 
We have characterized the two alternatives for an optimal steady state, both the interior 
solution and the case where the upper investment constraint binds at the optimum. The next 
task is to study the optimal approach paths. In general, approach paths in multi-dimensional 
models are often complicated to analyze, as exemplified by the predator-prey model of 
Mesterton-Gibbons (1996). For a more recent example, see Horan (2005). We find, however, 
that in our case it is possible to derive an intuitive solution which is easily explained 
graphically. As indicated above, the optimal trajectories result from a combination of extreme 
and singular controls. We know that both controls can be singular simultaneously only at an 
interior steady state, so that one of the control constraints must always bind outside an 
equilibrium. Whenever the animal stock is above the SH -schedule, it will be harvested down 
instantaneously (or more precisely, within on time period), until the SH -schedule is reached 
since tH is unconstrained from above. Then either i) the system will follow the 
SH -schedule, 
with singular harvest for a period of time, or ii) harvest is set to zero, in which case the SH -
schedule acts as a switch between extreme controls. Ignoring the case where StH H! , which 
is impossible for any more than one time period, we now consider the various alternative 
control regimes. The different cases can be best understood with reference to Figure 1 where a 
situation with a unique interior equilibrium is depicted. The singular control schedules are in 
accordance with the specific functional forms used in numerical section 6 (Eqs. 9’ and 10’ 
below). Four different initial states, labeled A, B, C and D, are shown along with the optimal 
approach paths originating from them. Notice that initial states A and C have the same value 
for the animal stock, whereas initial states B and D represent the same capital stock value. 
These properties are further exploited in the numerical section. Panel a) demonstrates the first 
three cases, where the upper investment constraint does not bind along the approach path. 
Case 1: 0H  , SI I . The only possibility when investment is singular outside of the steady 
state is that harvest is zero. This happens when, as from an initial situation such as A or B, the 
initial capital stock is below the steady state level and the system has been controlled to reach 
the singular investment schedule. The system will then follow the SI -schedule (10) towards 
the steady state, when the investment constraint does not bind.
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Case 2: SH H , 0I  . From an initial situation such as point D where both stocks are above 
their interior steady state levels, the animal stock is harvested down until the SH -schedule (9) 
is reached, and the system moves leftwards along the SH -schedule towards the equilibrium. 
Note that the SI -schedule plays no role here, and is therefore represented by a dashed line in 
the figure.  
Case 3: 0H  , 0I  . Here both controls are set to zero, which happens when the state of the 
system is below both singular control schedules, as at point C. This control regime continues 
until one of the two singular control schedules is reached, and one of the two above 
alternatives takes over. 
The next two ‘intermediate’ cases, where the upper investment constraint prevents the system 
from following the SI -schedule, are shown in panel b) Figure 1. Both these cases depend on 
the system having reached either the SH -schedule or the SI -schedule below and to the left of 
the equilibrium. This may happen if the initial states are given by points A or B. 
Case 4: 0H  , maxI I . When 0SH  , meaning that following the SH -schedule would 
require restocking of animals, which is omitted in our model, and S maxI I! , so that the 
maximum investment constraint does not allow the system to follow the SI -schedule either, 
the state of the system will be somewhere below the SH -schedule and above the SI -
schedule.
Case 5: SH H , maxI I . This situation arises when the system has reached the SH -
schedule (9), either after an initial impulse harvest, or from a situation such as in case 4, but 
the maximum per period investment is not sufficiently large to detract the system from the 
SH -schedule. The system will then follow the SH -schedule to the steady state. 
The last situation to consider is the alternative steady state where the upper investment 
constraint is binding. Panel c) Figure 1 demonstrates. The equilibrium can now be found as a 
point on the SH - schedule, below and to the left of the intersection point, with investment set 
to its maximum level at every point in time, * max SI I I  . As shown in the figure, the 
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approach path is along the SH -schedule from both directions in this case. However, for 
sufficiently low stock values it is still possible to follow the SI -schedule, as the animal stock 
growth is a constant share of the animal stock size, whereas the maximum investment is 
assumed to be independent of the size of the existing capital stock. 
The different control scenarios can be further characterized by dividing the state-state space 
into three regions, with three different transitional control regimes. Region I: Above the SH -
schedule; impulse harvest, Region II: Below the SH -schedule, above the SI -schedule;
0H  , maxI I and Region III: Below both schedules; 0H I  .
As is evident from Figure 1, the singular control schedules act either as switch lines or 
approach paths, depending on the control constraints. The approach path is identified as a 
bold line, which in panel a) consists of the part of the SI -schedule (10) that is to the left of the 
optimal steady state, and the part of the SH -schedule (9) that is to the right of the equilibrium. 
The upper constraint on investment may also entail that the SH -schedule must be followed 
even from the left, at least when the equilibrium is sufficiently close. This situation is depicted 
in panels b) and c) Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here] 
Whenever the initial point is above the singular harvest schedule, a situation exemplified by 
points A and D in Region I, the stock will be slaughtered down immediately until the sH -
schedule is reached. If the state of the system is now above the singular investment schedule, 
the SH -schedule acts as a switch and harvest is set to zero, as is the case when starting from 
point A. If not, the rest of the approach path is along the SH -schedule, as with the trajectory 
from point D. When starting from below both schedules, as from points B and C, the singular 
approach path is the one of the control schedules that is encountered first, after a period with 
zero harvest and investment. As indicated in Figure 1a), the approach path is thus the lower 
one of the two singular control schedules, when feasible. As seen on Figures 1b) and 1c), 
however, a part of this control path may not be feasible if the upper investment constraint 
binds. In this case only the leftmost part of the SI -schedule can be followed, while the 
equilibrium is encountered along the SH -schedule from both directions. The SI -schedule 
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may then act partly as a switch between zero and maximum investment, which the trajectory 
from point B indicates. 
By taking the first order difference of eqs. (9) and (10) , and using the growth equations to 
substitute for 1t tK K   and 1t tX X  , we can also derive explicit feedback rules for both 
stocks. Recalling that 0tH   along the singular investment schedule, singular investment is 
given by: 
 S X Kt t
K K
V Q XI K r
Q
J cc   ,
Where the coefficient for X  is positive. Singular investment therefore depends positively on 
depreciation, and also on animal stock growth. A higher stock of animals, and/or a higher 
animal growth rate means that investment must increase to let capital growth keep pace with 
growth in the animal stock. Singular harvest is given by: 
 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where the coefficient for tK  is positive, and with a similar interpretation. Note that the 
singular harvest rule is different depending on whether the system is on the SH -schedule to 
the left or right of the equilibrium, as investment will be set to maxI  or zero in the two 
situations, respectively. 
The next two results regard the monotonicity of the approach paths, and are related to results 
from the fisheries literature. First observe that the approach path is monotonous with respect 
to both X  and K  along the singular control schedules and in Region II (see the discussion 
above). Also note that a) In Region I there is only impulse harvest and no investment, and b) 
in Region III the monotonous part of approach path may be encountered on either side of the 
equilibrium if *0K K!  and *0X X . The first of these results is stated as: 
Result 4. It is never optimal for capital to overshoot its optimal steady state level. However, 
capital may undershoot the steady state if *0X X .
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Proof: Positive investment cannot occur in any of the two regions outside the monotonous 
part of the approach path. Hence, overshooting is impossible. Undershooting happens if, from 
Region III with *0K K!  and *0X X , the monotonous part of the approach path is reached 
where *tK K .
Corollary: It will never be optimal to have excess capacity in the steady state. 
This result differs from what is found by Clark et al. (1979), where it is optimal to have 
excess capacity in the steady state if the depreciation rate is zero. The reason that this does not 
happen here is that capital plays no role in the harvesting process. Therefore, it is not 
profitable, or possible, to speed up the approach to the equilibrium by overinvesting, if the 
initial animal stock is above the equilibrium level. The next result concerns the development 
of the animal stock: 
Result 5. The animal stock may either undershoot or overshoot the optimum, depending on 
the initial situation. 
Proof: When *0X X!  and *0K K  in Region I, the animal stock will be reduced 
immediately until the monotonous part of the approach path is reached where *tX X ,
implying undershooting. From Region III with *0K K!  and *0X X , overshooting occurs if 
the monotonous part of the approach path is reached where *tX X! .
This also contrasts the Clark et al. (1979) model, and subsequent contributions within the 
fisheries literature. The intuition is that a more profitable rate of capacity utilization can be 
obtained by temporarily reducing the animal stock below the steady state level if the capital 
stock is low, and expanding it beyond the steady state level if the capital stock is large. Both 
situations depend on the fact that the capital stock cannot be adjusted instantaneously in either 
direction. The next result is stated without proof as: 
Result 6: If the upper investment constraint is not binding on the approach path, the optimal 
steady state will almost always be approached with one control set at the interior and the other 
at zero. 
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In principle, all control combinations are possible approaches to the equilibrium, but the case 
where *0X X!  and *0K K , so that the equilibrium is reached by a one-time slaughtering 
down of the animal stock only, and the case where the equilibrium is reached by setting both 
controls to zero, can both only be satisfied by a fluke. The general approach is along one of 
the singular control schedules, and ruling out the possibility that maxI I  along the approach 
path, the non-singular of the controls must be zero. 
6. Numerical example 
To shed some further light on the above analysis, the model is now illustrated numerically1.
We do not attempt to accurately describe the economic situation of a Nordic sheep farmer, but 
to demonstrate the workings of the model with reasonably realistic parameter values. First, we 
specify the functional forms. The congestion cost function is specified as: 
(11)   2, ,
2t t tt
Q X K X
K
T 
where 0T ! . It is readily confirmed that this cost function satisfies the properties stated in 
section 2 above. The operating cost function is next specified as: 
(12) 2( )
2t t
V X XK ,
with 0K ! . With these functional forms, we find the following expression for the singular 
harvest and investment schedules: 
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 t
t
r p X
K
TG K§  ·  ¨ ¸© ¹ ,
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(10’) 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t
t
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TJ G § ·  ¨ ¸© ¹ .
It is easily recognized that both schedules start form the origin and have a positive slope.
While the singular investment schedule (Eq. 10’) is a straight line, the singular harvest 
schedule (Eq. 9’) yields X as a strictly concave function of K , cf. Figure 1 above. They have 
thus one interior intersection point, provided that the SH -schedule is steeper than the SI -
schedule at the origin, which corresponds to a stable equilibrium (see also section 4 above).

1 The numerical optimization was performed using the KNITRO for MATLAB solver form Ziena Optimization, 
with MATLAB release 2011b.
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The numerical optimization is performed using the parameter values found in Table II. As 
indicated, the discount rate, the growth rate for the animals and the indoor feeding cost 
parameter are taken from Skonhoft (2008) while the depreciation rate is what is used by 
Statistics Norway for buildings (Statistics Norway 2011). The investment and congestion cost 
parameters are calibrated for our model such that the number of animals in the steady state 
should represent a medium sized Norwegian farm. In addition, we assume that the maximum 
yearly investment is fixed at max 20I   (m2).
[Table II about here] 
Table III demonstrates the steady state results. The steady state is interior, as the depreciation 
is below the investment constraint; * max8K IJ   , and can be found as the solution to 
equations (9’) and (10’). The results with the baseline parameter values are shown in the first 
column, while the next column shows the results of a 50% increase in the meat price, to 360 
(EUR/animal), while all the other parameters are kept at their baseline values. In the last 
column the discount rate is increased by 50%, to 0.06G  . In the baseline calculation, the 
optimal stocking is 120 (animals), the capital stock becomes 200 (m2) while the profit is about 
9,800 (EUR). The change in the discount rate has a modest impact on the optimal steady state 
animal stock level while the effect on the capital stock is somewhat more substantial (see also 
the comparative static results Table I). The profit is only modestly affected. The slaughter 
price change, on the other hand, strongly affects the profit which is more than doubled 
compared to the baseline alternative. The optimal animal stock level is increased by 60%. 
Note also that capacity utilization is unaffected when the price shifts up. The reason is that the 
SI -schedule (10’) is linear and not affected by the slaughter price. A change in the discount 
rate, on the other hand, shifts this schedule as well as schedule (9’) and hence the rate of 
capacity utilization changes.    
[Table III about here] 
The dynamics are demonstrated in Figures 2 and 3 where the panels to the left are for the state 
variables while the panels to the right depict the corresponding harvest and investment paths. 
Four different initial situations are considered that correspond roughly to the initial states 
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depicted in Figure 1, such that  0 0,K X  assumes the values (50,110)  at point A,  210,20  at 
point B,  300,110  at point C and  210,200  at point D.  
In Figure 2, the approach paths from points A and C are depicted. In both these initial 
situations the animal stock size is 110 (animals), which is close to the optimum (Table III). 
The initial capital stock is either far below (A), or well above (C) its steady state level. This 
figure illustrates the possibilities for the animal stock to over- or undershoot the steady state. 
If 0 50K  , an immediate harvesting down of the animal stock is followed by a combination of 
maximum investment and singular harvest until the equilibrium is reached after about 12 
years. Since the investment constraint is binding along the approach path, but not in the steady 
state, the different trajectories corresponds to the ones depicted in panel b) in Figure 1. 
From 0 300K  , both controls are set to zero and the animal stock grows past its steady state 
level before the  singular harvest schedule is followed, with zero investment.    
[Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 3 demonstrates the optimal paths when the initial states are found as points B and D. 
With 0 210K  in both cases, the initial capital stock is close to the optimum, while the 
animal stock level is either far below (initial situation B with 0 20X  ), or far above (D with 
0 200X  ), the optimal steady state. In either case, the steady state is reached faster than in 
Figure 2, as both growth and reduction in the animal stock is faster than for the capital stock. 
Initial point B entails zero harvest and investment, followed by one period of maximum 
investment (Region II in Figure 1b) before the equilibrium is encountered. From initial 
situation D, impulse harvest and depreciation of the capital stock leads to the equilibrium after 
just two time periods. From point B, the capital stock undershoots the steady state (but may 
never overshoot, as discussed in section 5). 
[Figure 3 about here] 

7. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have from a theoretical point of view, analyzed the dynamic optimization 
problem of a profit maximizing farmer who possesses both animals and man-made capital. 
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The model builds on existing studies from the fisheries literature, but the important difference 
is that while capital is related to harvesting effort in the fisheries, capital attributes to 
production capacity to keep the animal stock during the winter in our farm model. The 
linearity of the model allows an intuitive graphical description that is rare in multi-
dimensional optimization problems. Both the steady state and the optimal approach paths 
have been characterized analytically, and demonstrated by a numerical example related to 
Scandinavian sheep farming.  
The steady state was shown to be either an interior optimum with interior controls, or a 
constrained optimum with investment set to its maximum value (Result 1). The effects of 
parameter changes were studied analytically. We found that with a higher meat price the 
farmer will find it beneficial to increase the stock of animals as well as the amount of capital 
in the interior steady state (Result 2), while an increase in the discount rate yields opposite 
effects (Result 3). 
As the objective function is linear in both control variables, the approach path is a 
combination of bang-bang and singular controls, and along the approach path at most one of 
the controls is singular. The dynamics are different from what is found in the typical fishery 
models, as in particular there will be a gradual building up of capital, not a one-time impulse 
investment where the capital stock overshoots the steady state. With capital, only 
undershooting is possible (Result 4). The animal stock may, on the other hand, both over- and 
undershoot the optimal steady state (Result 5). In general, one of the controls will be singular 
along the approach path while the other is set to zero, if the upper investment constraint does 
not bind (Result 6). 
We have focused on a situation with a unique interior equilibrium. However, with different 
specifications of the cost function there may be several equlibria. With a positive discount 
rate, the choice of steady state will then in general depend on the initial situation, so that the 
system is history dependent. The dynamics of such a system will be a rather straightforward 
generalization of the system analyzed here however, once the optimal steady state is 
identified. Another possible extension is to include an absolute limit on the number of animals 
per square meter of housing, typically set by authorities to secure animal health. If this 
constraint binds along the approach path it will imply maximum investment together with 
21
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positive harvest of animals. If the capacity utilization constraint is binding in the steady state, 
it will imply singular steady state harvest along with maximum investment.  
The main contribution of this paper is related to the role of capital which is used here for 
maintaining the animals and hence plays no role in the harvesting process. In addition, we 
assume a domestic animal stock where the unit harvest cost is stock independent, and natural 
growth is density independent and hence also unaffected by stock size. Given that these 
assumptions also are valid in other types of production involving domestic renewable 
resources, the model here may have wider applications. Possible examples include other types 
of livestock management and other areas of modern agricultural production, as well as 
aquaculture.  
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Tables and figures
Table I: Comparative static results interior steady state with singular harvest and 
investment. In parentheses the constrained steady state with * maxI I .
p c G r J
*X     0         
*K  0  0  0  0   
*H     0         
*I  0  0  0  0  0r
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Table II: Baseline parameter values 
Parameter Description Value
G Discount rate 0.04
r Animal growth rate 0.7 
c Unit investment cost (EUR/m2) 100
K Feeding cost (EUR/animal2) 1.1 
T Congestion cost (EUR/(animal2/m2)) 45
J Depreciation rate 0.04
p Meat price (EUR/animal) 240
Sources: r , K  and p  based on Skonhoft (2008), J  from  
Statistics Norway (2011), c  and T  calibrated.  
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Table III: Steady state results 
  Baseline p up 50% į up 50% 
Animals *X 120 192 112  
Capital (m2) *K 200 322 168 
Capacity utilization (animals/m2) * *X K 0.60 0.60 0.67 
Slaughter income (EUR) *prX 20,160 48,384 18,816 
Investment cost (EUR) *c KJ 800 1288 672 
Feeding cost (EUR) *2
2
XK 7,920 20,275 6,899 
Congestion cost (EUR) *2
2
X
K
T
1,620 2,576 1,680 
Annual profit (EUR) *S 9,820 24,245 9,565 
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1a)

1b)
1c)
1 a) Both controls singular near the steady 
state. 
1 b): Approach paths with maxSI I  near the 
equilibrium, but interior steady state. 
1 c): Constrained steady state; m* axI I .
Figure 1: Optimal approach paths, unique steady state. 
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Figure 2. Optimal approach paths baseline parameter values. Initial situation A 
( 0 50K  , 0 110X  ) and C ( 0 300K  , 0 110X  ).   
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Balancing income and cost in red deer management  
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Abstract  
This paper presents a bioeconomic analysis of a red deer population within a Norwegian 
institutional context. This population is managed by a well-defined manager, typically 
consisting of many landowners operating in a cooperative manner, with the goal of 
maximizing the present-value hunting related income while taking browsing and grazing 
damages into account. The red deer population is structured in five categories of animals 
(calves, female and male yearlings, adult females and adult males). It is shown that 
differences in the per animal meat values and survival rates (‘biological discounted’ values) 
are instrumental in determining the optimal harvest composition. Fertility plays no direct role.
It is argued that this is a general result working in stage structured models with harvest values. 
In the numerical illustration it is shown that the optimal harvest pattern stays quite stable 
under various parameter changes. It is revealed which parameters and harvest restrictions that 
is most important. We also show that the current harvest pattern involves too much yearling 
harvest compared with the economically efficient level.  
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21.Introduction
The management of deer have become in focus with recent large increases in population sizes 
in many areas of both Europe and North America (Gordon et al., 2004). Increased abundance 
increases potential yields. However, the increasing number of deer-vehicle collisions and their 
related costs (Langbein et al., 2010), deer damages to forestry and agriculture (Reimoser and 
Putman, 2010) and their general ecosystem impact (Mysterud, 2006; Reimoser and Putman, 
2010) are also important concerns accompanying the population increase. Large herbivores 
are termed ecological keystone species because of their ability to affect vegetation community 
patterns and ecosystem functioning (Côté et al., 2004; Hobbs, 1996). Deer management 
decisions are therefore important issues that generally influence both ecological and economic 
aspects.  
A good example of this development is the Norwegian red deer (Cervus elaphus) population, 
which has increased and spread substantially during the last few decades (Milner et al., 2006). 
The red deer has become the most numerous wild ungulate in Norway both measured as the 
number of harvested individuals (Statistics Norway, 2010) as well as number of live animals 
in the population (Andersen et al., 2010). In 1970 the total number of harvested red deer was 
about 2,800, and animals were mainly found in scattered and low density populations along 
the south-western part of the country (Figure 1). In 2009 red deer are found in nearly all 
municipalities of southern Norway, and the total number of shot animals exceeded 39,000 
animals. However, the main populations are still situated in the traditional core areas.
Red deer are extensively utilized as a game species, and the management strategy in Norway 
has traditionally been oriented towards meat hunting rather than trophy hunting (Milner et al., 
2006). Large deer populations both represent a potential source of income for the landowners 
possessing the hunting rights, as well as a potential cost related to damages from grazing and 
browsing. The harvest related benefits are typically associated with sale of meat and hunting 
rights, whereas additional services or products (cabin rental, guiding, etc.) generally represent 
a modest source of income (Olaussen and Mysterud, Unpublished). The main cost component 
is normally reduced production from agricultural crops (mostly grass production), both in 
terms of quality and quantity. In addition, browsing damage to economically important tree 
species may also be important in some areas. There are also significant costs related to deer-
vehicle collisions (Mysterud, 2004). Such costs are both complex to quantify (Bissonette et 
al., 2008) and paid by the general public.
3We apply a five stage population model (calves, female and male yearlings, adult females, 
and adult males). The main goal is to analyze the basic economic and biologic driving forces 
behind optimal harvesting strategies given various constraints related to male-female 
composition, and current code of conduct among hunters regarding to avoid shooting the 
mother from calves. The theoretical results are illustrated numerically. Since costs related to 
deer-vehicle collisions are external to landowners, they will not be taken into account here. 
The landowner, typically consisting of several landowners acting as a single agent through a 
landowner association (management unit), is assumed to be rational and well-informed 
aiming to maximize the profit from hunting when accounting for grazing costs, but also 
taking the recreational aspect of the hunting into account. We also compare the results with 
the present harvesting pattern, which has been established through cohort analyses (Veiberg et 
al., 2010). Our analysis may be related to the small, but growing literature, on economic 
analysis of stage structured fishery and animal models, exemplified by Tahvonen (2009) and 
Olaussen and Skonhoft (2011). Like these studies a dynamic optimization framework is used, 
but different from these studies more value components are included in the management 
problem.   
2. Methods and material 
2.1 Population model
In Norway mean dressed body weight (i.e., live weight minus skin, head, viscera, metapodials 
and bleedable blood) for males and females 2 years and older is usually between 60-125 kg 
and 50-70 kg, respectively (Solberg et al., 2010, see also Table 1). Due to lack of predators 
natural mortality rates are generally assumed to be low for all age and sex categories. As 
mortality throughout summer and fall is regarded to be small, all natural mortality is supposed 
to take place during the winter and after the hunting season and are assumed density-
independent (Loison and Langvatn, 1998). On the other hand, fecundity is affected by female 
density (Langvatn et al., 2004), while the number of males seems to be of negligible 
importance for a small and moderately skewed sex composition (Mysterud et al., 2002).  
In the present analysis the population at time (year) t  is structured in five stages; calves ,c tX
( 1yr  ), female yearlings ,yf tX  (1 2yrd  ), male yearlings ,ym tX , adult females ,f tX  ( 2yr t
) and adult males ,m tX . The population is measured in spring before calving. All stages may be 
4harvested, and where the hunting starts early September and ends mid-November. Neglecting 
any dispersal in or out of the considered area, the number of calves (recruitment) is first 
governed by , 1 , , , ,c t yf t yf t f t f tX r X r X    , so that ,yf tr is the fertility rate of yearlings and ,f tr the
fertility rate of adults. Unless the number of males becomes extremely low, the male 
abundance and sex composition has negligible influence on female fertility rates (Mysterud et 
al., 2002). We therefore assume that only the total number of females, yearlings and adults, 
affect female fertility rates. Moreover, as female yearlings and adult females compete over the 
same resources, we assume that the fertility rates for both categories are affected only by the 
total number of females present. We then have , , ,( )yf t yf yf t f tr r X X  , with (0) 0yfr ! and
, ,/ ( ) 0yf yf t f t yfr X X rcw w     for yearlings, and , , ,( )f t f yf t f tr r X X  , with (0) 0fr ! and
0frc  , for adults. The density dependent recruitment function then yields: 
, 1 , , , , , ,( ) ( )c t yf yf t f t yf t f f t yf t f tX r X X X r X X X     .     (1) 
The number of female and male yearlings follows next as: 
, 1 , ,(1 )yf t c c t c tX s h X\           (2)
and
, 1 , ,(1 ) (1 )ym t c c t c tX s h X\           (3)
where cs is the fixed calf natural survival rate (fraction) and \  is the proportion of female 
calves. ,0 1c thd d  is the calf harvesting rate. Finally, the abundance of adult females and 
males become: 
, 1 , , , ,(1 ) (1 )f t yf yf t yf t f f t f tX s h X s h X          (4)
and
, 1 , , , ,(1 ) (1 )m t ym ym t ym t m m t m tX s h X s h X     ,     (5) 
respectively. fs  and ms are the fixed natural survival rate of adult females and males, and 
where f ms st . yfs and yms  are the yearling survival rates, also with yf yms st (Table 1). 
,0 1yf thd d  and ,0 1ym thd d  are the harvesting rates of female and male yearlings, 
respectively, while  ,0 1f thd d and ,0 1m thd d are the harvesting rates of the two adult stages.  
Equation (2) and (3) together yield: 
, ,[(1 ) / ]ym t yf tX X\ \  .       (6) 
5Therefore, with 0.5\ | the number of female and male yearlings will be similar at every 
point in time. Using equation (6) to eliminate ,ym tX  from equation (5), we find the abundance 
of adult males as:  
, 1 , , , ,(1 )[(1 ) / ] (1 )m t ym ym t yf t m m t m tX s h X s h X\ \          (7)
Equations (1), (2), (4) and (7) now constitute a reduced form model in four stages and five 
harvesting rates, and where all equations are first order difference equations. We employ this 
system of equations when studying exploitation below.
2.2 Landowner benefits and costs 
As indicated, management units regularly consist of several landowners. Each landowner 
contributes to the total area (the counting area) with the part of their property that satisfies 
given criteria defined in regulations. On the basis of the total counting area, the municipality 
then allows harvest of a given number of deer. Within the management unit, decisions related 
to e.g. distribution of hunting licenses, costs and income are made by majority of votes. In the 
voting process all landowners either represent equal votes or their influence is differentiated 
through weighted voting on the basis of their contribution to the common counting area. The 
traditional landowner management goal has been directed towards maximizing the population 
productivity in order to produce meat, but also with a strong recreational component 
(Andersen et al., 2010; Milner et al., 2006). The hunters have typically been local people, the 
landowners and their families and friends, and the hunting has had some flavor of subsistence 
hunting (Andersen et al., 2011; Olaussen and Mysterud, 2012). In what follows, we think of 
the hunters as the local people enjoying the meat value and the recreational value of the 
hunting. The utility derived from the meat value is assumed to be linear in the hunt, while the 
recreational value is linear in the hunting rates. As will be seen, this difference has a 
substantial impact on the solution of the model. 
We start to look at the hunting where the number of animals removed through hunting in year 
t  is defined as , , ,i t i t i tH h X ( , , , ,i c yf ym f m ). The value (price) per kg harvested meat pˆ  is 
assumed to be independent of number of animals hunted, population density and animal 
category, as well as assumed to be fixed over time. The current gross meat value is 
accordingly , , , , , , , , , ,ˆ ( )c c t c t yf yf t yf t ym ym t ym t f f t f t m m t m tp w h X w h X w h X w h X w h X    and where 
c yf ym f mw w w w w d    are the (average) dressed weights (kg per animal) of the different 
6categories of animals (Table 1). For every animal shot the landowner pays a fixed fee iq (NOK
per animal) to the municipality. This fee is typically differentiated between calves and older 
animals (Table 2). For landowners the yearly net benefit from hunting measured as meat 
value is then defined as:
, , , , , , , , , ,t c c t c t yf yf t yf t ym ym t ym t f f t t m m t m tV p h X p h X p h X p h X p h X     ,   (8) 
and where ˆ( )i i ip pw q  ( , , , ,i c yf ym f m ) is the net per animal meat value (NOK per 
animal). 
In addition to the meat value, the hunters also obtain a recreational value. Studies from elk 
hunting in US (Aiken and Pullis La Rouche, 2001) and from Sweden (Boman et al., 2011) 
indicate that time spent on hunting is valuable. In what follows, only the hunting time is 
considered as an indicator for recreational value and hence all other valuable aspects of the 
hunting, except of the meat value, are lumped into this indicator. When using a production 
function approach and where the production (harvesting) function is assumed to be of the 
standard Schaefer type with perfect selectivity (e.g., Clark, 1990), the number of hunted 
animals of category i  becomes , , ,i t i i t i tH N XT ( , , , ,i c yf ym f m ). ,i tN hence indicates the 
hunting effort, measured in number of hunting days, and iT is the catchability (productivity) 
coefficient (1/hunting days). The value will typically differ somewhat between the various 
categories of animals, but probably not too much. In what follows, it is assumed to be 
identical. Therefore, with z as the recreational value (NOK per hunting day), the recreation 
value writes , , , , ,( )t c t yf t ym t f t m tB z N N N N N     , or
, , , , ,( / )( )t c t yf t ym t f t m tB z h h h h hT          (9)
when substituting for the harvest functions. The total yearly hunting benefit is hence 
described as ( )t tV B .
The underlying causes explaining the occurrence and extent of deer damages are complex and 
not fully understood, but crop type and population density are assumed to be the most relevant 
factors (Reimoser and Putman, 2010). In a descriptive study from one of the core hunting 
areas in Norway  Thorvaldsen et al. (2010) found that crop damages on agricultural land was 
more important than damages to commercial tree species. Only crop damage is considered 
here, and as it takes place during the spring, summer and early fall, it is the pre-harvest 
population size that is relevant. When assuming that the agriculture damage cost functions are 
7linear, with unit values as c yf ym f md d d d d d    (Table 2), these costs may thus be written 
as:
   , , , , ,t c c t yf yf t ym ym t f f t m m tD d X d X d X d X d X     .     (10) 
Therefore, the landowner yearly net benefit is described by: 
t t t tR V B D          (11)
2.3 Optimal management 
2.3.1 Hunting meat value benefit only 
We first study the situation where the landowner maximizes the hunting benefit meat value 
only. With 1/(1 )U G  as the discount factor with 0G t as the (yearly) fixed discount rate, 
the goal is thus to find harvest rates that maximizes the present-value 
, , , , ,, , , , 0
max
c t yf t ym t f t m t
t
t
th h h h h t
VU f
 
¦
subject to the biological growth equations (1), (2), (4) and (7). In addition, a female – calf 
harvest restriction is included (Olaussen and Skonhoft, 2011) due to the common code of 
conduct among hunters to avoid shooting the mother from calves: 
, , , ,f t f t c t c th X h Xd .        (12) 
A restriction on the number of harvested males is also incorporated to avoid a too skewed sex 
ratio:
,m t mh hd and ,ym t mh hd .        (13) 
In a Supplement section the optimal control conditions are stated and the basic driving forces 
steering the harvest composition are revealed. We now discuss these driving forces, first by 
disregarding the code of conduct constraints (12) and (13). 
For both sexes, we find that simultaneous harvest of both yearlings and adults does not satisfy 
the optimality criteria. Next, it can be shown that positive female yearling harvest together 
with zero adult female harvest implies / /yf yf f fp s p s! ; that is, the ‘biological discounted’ 
female yearling hunting value (in NOK per animal) exceeds the ‘biological discounted’ adult 
female hunting value. When the adult category is more valuable than the yearling category, 
f yfp p! , and as long as the survival rates yfs and ys do not differ too much (Tables 1 and 2, 
numerical section), this inequality represents a contradiction. In the same manner, we also 
find that positive male yearling harvest together with zero adult male harvest implies
8/ /ym ym m mp s p s! which also represent a contradiction within the range of realistic parameter 
values. Therefore, positive female yearling harvest and zero female adult harvesting and 
positive male yearling harvest and zero adult male harvesting are not possible options when 
the code of conduct constraints (12) and (13) are not binding and when the harvest recreation 
value is small and hence neglected. 
Since, the ‘biological discounted’ value of the calf category is lower than for the yearlings,
/ /c c i ip s p s  ( ,i yf ym ) (see Table 1 and 2), we may also suspect that calf harvest 
together with zero adult harvest will not represent an optimal harvesting policy when the code 
of conduct constraint (12) is not binding. We find that zero yearling harvest together with 
positive harvest of one, or both, of the adult categories do not contradict the optimality 
conditions. The reason for this outcome is simply that the per animal values are higher for the 
adults than for yearlings while the survival rates do not differ too much.  
Based on the optimality conditions it is difficult to say something definite about the harvest 
composition among the adults. However, if both adult females and males are harvested in the 
unbinding case, this result may change when the restrictions (12) and (13) are included. First 
suppose that restriction (12) is included, while we still neglect restriction (13). If females are 
harvested, the code of conduct restriction (12) indicates that at least the same number of 
calves must be harvested. Since the restriction is unbinding if more calves than females are 
harvested, we already know from the unbinding case that no calves should be harvested. 
Therefore, harvesting more calves than females represents a contradiction both in the 
unbinding as well as the binding case. Hence, the restriction must bind with the same positive 
number of calves and females harvested, or zero harvest of both. When constraint (12) binds, 
it will certainly also influence the various possibilities of yearling harvest together with adult 
female and male harvest. We may hence find that yearling harvest together with male harvest 
occurs in the optimal solution. When restriction (13) is included and binds, , ,m t ym t mh h h  ,
this will generally also influence the various optimal harvest options. Both yearling female, 
calf and adult female harvest may be affected due to less yearling and adult male harvest. The 
intuition is straightforward as e.g., calf harvest is an indirect way of controlling the yearling 
category when the yearling male harvest is restricted. Hence, even if calf harvest is not an 
optimal option in the unrestricted case, it may very well be optimal in the restricted case.
9Summing up, we have demonstrated that differences in the ‘biological discounted’ value of 
various animal categories are the basic driving forces behind the optimal harvest composition. 
Fertility plays no direct role. However, certain modifying and complicating factors related to 
the common code of conduct constraint (12) and male harvest constraint (13) are present. 
These constraints also complicates our understanding of how the harvest composition and the 
populations may evolve over time; that is, the dynamic properties of the model. However, 
because of the strong degree of linearity in the model together with density dependent 
regulation through the recruitment function, we may suspect that oscillations will not be 
present and that the harvesting composition will approach a stable equilibrium.  
2.3.2 Crop damage taken into account 
We then look at the problem when also the damage costs are taken into account, but the 
recreational hunting value is still not included. Therefore, the problem now is to find the 
harvesting strategy that 
, , , , ,, , , , 0
max ( )
c t yf t ym t f t m t
t
t
t th h h h h t
V DU f
 
¦ , again subject to the biological growth 
equations (1), (2), (4) and (7) and the code of conduct constraints (12) and (13).
Because the damage in year t  takes place before the harvest (see Eq. 10), the first order 
necessary control conditions will be identical to the above problem of maximizing the hunting 
benefit only (Supplement section). However, we may suspect that the harvesting pressure will 
be higher when damage costs are included (see e.g., Skonhoft and Olaussen, 2005)..
2.3.3 Recreational value included  
When taking the recreational value of hunting into account, the current net benefit is defined 
by equation (11), and the problem is hence to 
, , , , ,, , , , 0
max ( )
c t yf t ym t f t m t
t
t
t t th h h h h t
V B DU f
 
 ¦ , subject to 
the same constraints as above. The solution to this problem gives the ‘overall’ optimal 
solution for the landowners. In this case, not only differences in per animal values and 
survival rates (‘biological discounted’ values) are instrumental in determining the harvest 
composition, but also the demographic composition of the population (see Supplement 
section). We may also suspect that the harvesting composition is more prone to changes over 
time because the strong degree of linearity in the model is no longer present. Generally, we 
find the dynamics now to be strikingly different. See Results section.

10
3. Results 
3.1 Data and specific functional forms
The model is now illustrated numerically for an area located in the county Sogn and Fjordane 
on the south western coast of Norway. This county is the core area for red deer hunting in 
Norway. The fertility rate (see Methods and material section) is expressed as a sigmoid 
function predicting increased degree of density dependence with higher population densities 
(Langvatn et al., 2004). The function reads: 
   , , , , ,1 i
i
i t i yf t f t b
yf t f t
rr r X X
X X K
   ª º ¬ ¼

;  ( ,i yf f )   (14) 
with ˆ 0ir !  as the intrinsic growth rate (maximum number of calves per female), 0K !  as the 
female ‘carrying capacity’ and 0ib !  as a compensation parameter. Equation (14) then 
implies the recruitment function (1) of the Shepherd type. Table 1 gives the baseline 
parameter values for this function as well as the other biological parameter values. The 
parameter K  is scaled for our study area and is 4,000 (animals). See Table 1.  
The baseline economic parameter values are given in Table 2. The value of the catchability
coefficient 0.0001T   (1/hunting days) is calibrated based on reported hunting productivity. 
The per day recreational hunting value 50z  (NOK/day) is taken from a study from the actual 
area (Thorvaldsen et al., 2010). The crop damage cost parameters are based on Olaussen and 
Mysterud (2012) while the meat value p is assumed similar among all categories of animals. 
We assume a zero discount rate in the baseline scenario. As known (e.g., Clark, 1990), this 
means that the (possible) steady state of the dynamic optimization problem coincides with the 
solution to the problem of maximizing current net benefit in biological equilibrium. The 
numerical results are first presented when only meat value and damage costs are included. 
Then we present results when also the recreation value of the hunting is taken into account. 
 
3.2 Results when recreation value is not included 
We first present the basic dynamic harvesting results2. As already indicated, because of the 
strong degree of linearity in the model together with density dependent regulation through the 
recruitment function, the model solution approaches a stable equilibrium. Because the profit 
function is linear in harvest, economic theory for one-stage models (or biomass models) 
2 The dynamic optimization was performed with the KNITRO for MATLAB solver from Ziena Optimization, 
with MATLAB release 2011b.  
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suggest that harvest should be adjusted such as to lead the populations to their optimal steady 
states as rapid as possible – if no constraints are binding (for proof of the Most Rapid 
Approach Path theorem, see Spence and Starrett, 1975). Figure 2 demonstrates the optimal 
harvest rate dynamics with the baseline parameter values, and when both meat value and 
grazing damage are included (Case 1 in Table 3 below). The results here seem to partly 
confirm the most rapid approach principle also in our linear multi-stage model. Starting with 
populations equal to 300 for all categories, calves and adult females are not harvested until 
they have grown to their optimal population sizes. Adult males, on the other hand, are 
harvested at the maximum rate even though the population is below its optimal steady state. 
This occurs because constraint (13) binds for adult males in the steady state, so postponing 
harvest until the optimal population size is reached would lead to overshooting. We also 
studied the effect of changing the discount rate on the time path and steady state in this Case 
1. We find, not surprisingly, that increasing the discount rate results in progressively smaller 
populations while the dynamics do not change qualitatively. The effects of other initial 
population values were examined as well without changing the qualitative structure of the 
dynamics. Neither was other steady state values found (‘ergodic’ dynamics).  
Tables 3 and 4 report the detailed steady state results for different configurations of parameter 
values and constraints. Table 3 shows the optimal harvest rates and population sizes for all 
stages. Table 4 presents the economic results. From Table 3 we see that 20 % of the calves are 
harvested in Case 1, because the female-calf harvesting constraint (12) is binding, and the 
harvest rate of adult females is 0.15. The adult male harvest constraint (13) also binds with 
0.55mh  . It is not beneficial with harvest of yearlings because the ‘biologically discounted’ 
values are lower for yearlings than for adults. The adult male/female sex ratio becomes
740 / 2,158 0.34| . In this case, as well as in the other cases, we find identical numbers of 
yearling males and yearling females because of equal sex ratio in the recruitment, 0.5\  (see
Methods and material section and Table 1). From Table 4, we find the total yearly meat value 
to be 4,071 (1,000 NOK), with grazing damage costs being 1,843. Net average yearly income 
per hunted animal is 2.102 (1,000 NOK).  
Case 2 describes what happens when the meat value is increased with 50 % while all other 
parameter values are kept constant. This leads to a slight adjustment in the harvest ratios for 
calves and adult females, but probably more important, to higher standing populations (Table 
12
3). This result contrasts standard biomass harvesting theory (e.g., Clark, 1990). Obviously, the 
net economic value per animal both when hunted and when alive (as ‘capital’) increases when 
the meat value shifts up. For a given harvest activity, a price increase leads to an equal 
increase in income. When costs are unchanged, the increase in net benefit will, however, 
always be higher. In addition, the harvest activity will be adjusted to take further advantage of 
the price change. Following the 50 % price increase, we hence find a doubling of total net 
benefit (Table 4). 
In Case 3 the grazing damage tD in equation (10) is ignored; that is, the landowners optimize 
without taking the grazing damage into account. Optimal population sizes are affected as the 
cost of keeping the population, as viewed by the landowner, is reduced. This leads to a change 
in harvest pattern and population size that works in the same direction as the price increase. 
The implied economic effect, on the other hand, goes in the opposite direction as the actual
grazing damage will be larger, and amounts to a 10 % decrease in total net benefit (Table 4).
The female-calf constraint (12) is excluded in Case 4. As expected, there is no harvest of 
calves. The male harvesting constraint still binds with 0.55mh  , and the adult female harvest 
rate increases to 0.21fh  . Population sizes increase moderately, except for adult females. 
Total net benefit increases with about 14 %, from 2,228 (1,000 NOK) to 2,537, and there is a 
significant increase in the net benefit per hunted animal as the average weight of a hunted 
animal is higher. Therefore, the cost of the code of conduct constraint (12) is quite significant.
The contours in Figure 3 indicate the steady state net economic benefit ( )V D for different 
combinations of fh and mh , and demonstrates the sensitivity of the net economic benefit to 
changes in the adult harvesting rates, when all the other harvesting rates are kept constant at 
their optimal levels. The left panel is for the baseline Case 1, while the right panel is for Case 
4 (i.e., without the cow-calf constraint). When the female-calf harvesting constraint is 
included as in Case 1, the maximum possible harvest ratio of adult females is around 0.15, as 
a higher harvest ratio implies a violation of constraint (12) when the harvest rate of calves is 
kept constant. In Case 4 however, the maximum sustainable harvest rate of adult females is 
around 0.4, which is equal to the recruitment rate of adult females when no calves or female 
yearlings are harvested.
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From the left panel it is seen that combinations of the male harvesting rates within the range 
0.40 – 0.55 and female rates within the range 0.15 – 0.10 yields a net benefit of about 2,000 
(1,000 NOK) which implies an approximate 10 % reduction in net benefit compared to the 
optimal steady state (see also Table 4). This indicates that the profit loss is modest within a 
quite wide range of harvesting combinations. In the right, panel, where the code of conduct 
constraint (12) is omitted, net benefit is even less sensitive to adjustments in the adult harvest 
ratios. The inclusion of the zero profit contour line indicates when profit turns negative 
because of high grazing damage, and occurs when harvest rates become low and populations 
become large. In Case 4, net benefits decrease to around -7 mill. NOK for zero harvest of 
adults (while still keeping other harvest rates constant at their optimal levels). This dramatic 
impact on profit is to a large extent due to grazing damage being linearly related to population 
size, an assumption that may be unrealistic for large populations. 
3.3 Uniform harvesting pattern
One interesting aspect of stage structured harvesting is to what extent the complexity involved 
in this kind of management practice pays its way through a significantly higher economic 
benefit yield than a uniform harvest rate across all stages. Such uniform hunting pattern 
implies an exploitation scheme where the present value benefit is maximized under the same 
biological constraints as above (but not constraints 12 and 13), but with the additional 
constraint of equal harvest rates across all age classes imposed. Results from this uniform 
harvesting scheme are reported as Case 5 in Table 3 and 4. As indicated here, uniform harvest 
implies a highly inefficient exploitation pattern, where the net benefit is reduced with about 
50 % compared to the baseline Case 1. 
3.4 Also including the recreational aspect 
So far, the hunting recreational value has not been included in the numerical analysis. As 
mentioned above (Optimal management section) this adjustment complicates the solution 
considerably. The long term optimal solution may no longer be a steady state, but perpetual 
oscillations between more profitable, but unsustainable, outcomes. Figure 4 shows that, under 
the same assumptions as in Case 1, and with a recreational value of 50z   (NOK/day) 
included, oscillating harvest rates for the calves and the female categories emerge. The 
harvest rates of both adult and yearling males become constant and equal to their upper 
constraint levels, whereas the harvest rates of calves, yearling and adult females oscillates 
between zero and 0.45, 0.30 and 1, respectively.
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The pulse cycle lengths seem to be quite similar for the different stages. However, the periods 
of hunting are not synchronized and where the top of the cycles occurs earlier for the adult 
than the yearlings and the calves. As indicated above (Optimal management section), more 
complex dynamics may evolve when the strong degree of linearity, or concavity, in the model 
is no longer present. Once the non-concavity is introduced by the recreational value, the 
possibility for oscillations depends on combinations of all parameters in the model. Generally, 
it seems that this non-concavity effect is stronger for smaller populations, so that everything 
that leads to reduced populations will increase the possibility of oscillations, once the 
recreational value is incorporated into the analysis. This includes higher discount rates, higher 
grazing damage, lower meat price and also the magnitude of the recreational value itself. All 
these factors may also influence the synchronizing of the pulse hunting. For baseline 
parameter values, pulse harvesting occurs only if the recreational parameter z  value exceeds 
a certain critical value ( 25z  ).
4. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the cost and benefit of a red deer population within a five 
stage model with density-dependent fertility and density independent mortality. This 
population is managed by a well-defined manager with the goal of maximizing the present-
value hunting related income while taking grazing damages into account. The different ways 
to compose the harvest across age and sex categories and the implied economic benefits are 
highlighted. Without any restrictions on the harvest, and ignoring the recreation aspect of the 
hunting, we find that the ‘biological discounted’ values for the various categories of animals 
are instrumental in determining the optimal harvesting composition. The difference in the 
‘biological discounted’ value between two animal categories is made up of the net per animal 
meat value difference as the marginal gain while the difference in natural mortality rate 
represents the marginal loss. The importance of these factors seems to be a general result in 
stage structured models where harvest value is maximized. See e.g., the moose harvest model 
in Olaussen and Skonhoft (2011), the fishery analysis in Skonhoft et al. (2012) and the 
classical Reed (1980) fishery article. 
The Results section illustrates numerically the predictions from the theoretical model. In the 
baseline case (Case 1) where the meat value and the grazing damage, but not the recreational 
value, are included, we find that all stages except yearlings are harvested. The females and 
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calves are harvested only moderately, and calves are harvested due to the imposed code of 
conduct restriction (12). We also find that the same pattern persists when the meat price goes 
up (Case 2) and when grazing damage costs are ignored (Case 3), but the total population 
becomes substantially higher in both cases. However, the implied economic effect differs 
between the two cases. When the code of conduct constraint (12) is excluded (Case 4), we 
find that no calves are harvested, and the harvest of adult females increased to 21 %. Net 
benefit increased by 14 %. The landowner net benefit is also calculated when the optimal 
selective harvesting patterns were replaced by ‘optimal’ uniform harvest rates (Case 5). 
When the recreational hunting value is included in the objective function, we find that the 
optimal harvesting scheme involved oscillating harvest rates. This result is not a new one 
within the resource management literature; it has been shown to exist in various models 
(e.g.,Wirl, 1995), and in particular when there is imperfect selectivity in the harvest 
(Tahvonen, 2009).
Our results may be compared to the current red deer harvesting practices. The present 
harvesting regimes of red deer in Norway varies a great deal as a consequence of variation in 
local population density, demography and red deer related conflicts. On the other hand, a 
general pattern is that calves and yearlings are rather extensively harvested. This is also so for 
calves in our numerical illustration. As the traditional management practice in general has 
been oriented towards stimulating population increase, males have also been subject to a more 
extensive harvest compared to females. This male-biased harvest has resulted in female-
biased populations with a high growth potential. Based on extensive data series from culled 
animals, population size and demographic composition have been reconstructed through 
cohort analyses for three regions in Norway (Veiberg et al., 2010). The adult sex ratio varied 
between 3-3.7 females per male. The harvest rates for adult females were rather moderate and 
stable through all of their lifespan (0.13-0.16). In contrast, the harvest rates of adult males 
were significantly higher (0.40-0.49) and varied considerably with age. The empirical harvest 
rates for adult females are quite in line with the steady state alternatives described for Case 1-
3. These three cases also represent the most realistic harvest scenarios given the present code 
of conduct and the Norwegian hunting tradition. The experienced adult sex ratio was also 
quite equal to the steady state sex ratios in Case 1-3. A striking difference between the current 
hunting practice and all the steady state alternatives, apart from Case 5, is that yearling 
harvest represents a significant proportion of the total red deer harvest. On the national level 
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yearlings in general represent 30 % of the total red deer harvest (Statistics Norway, 2010), 
and the sex specific harvest rates were found to vary between 0.16-0.26 for yearling females 
and 0.40-0.49 for yearling males (Veiberg et al., 2010). 
This indicates that there is a clear scope for improving the economics of the present hunting 
practice by lowering the yearling harvest. The current harvesting strategy is consolidated 
through a mixture of economic, ecological and evolutionary factors in addition to cultural 
history and former management aims lingering after the aim has been achieved (Milner et al., 
2011). The current practice with a relatively large proportion of both yearlings and calves in 
the harvest in both Sweden and Norway for both red deer and moose was introduced many 
decades ago when population growth was a main management goal. There is, however, an 
increasing awareness of red deer as an economic resource (Olaussen and Mysterud, 2012) 
which may stimulate a future approach to a more economically optimized harvesting strategy 
as presented here. 
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Table 1. Baseline biological parameter values.
Parameters Description Value Reference/source 
 
maximum specific growth rate 
yearlings 
0.6 Langvatn et al. (2004)  
 
maximum specific growth rate 
adults
0.96 Langvatn et al. (2004)   
K carrying capacity females  4000 (animals) Calibrated 
byf density compensation parameter 
yearlings 
2 Nilsen et al. (2005) 
bf density compensation parameter 
adults
2 Nilsen et al. (2005) 
wc mean weight calves 25.5 (kg) Solberg et al. (2010) 
wyf mean weight female yearlings 43.1 (kg) Solberg et al. (2010) 
wym mean weight male yearlings 49.4 (kg) Solberg et al. (2010) 
wf mean weight females 57.3 (kg) Solberg et al. (2010) 
wm mean weight male 77.6 (kg) Solberg et al. (2010) 
sc survival rate calves 0.75 Langvatn and Loison (1999) 
syf survival rate female yearlings 0.92 Langvatn and Loison (1999) 
sym survival rate male yearlings 0.87 Langvatn and Loison (1999) 
sf survival rate adult females 0.93 Langvatn and Loison (1999) 
sm survival rate adult males 0.93 Langvatn and Loison (1999) 
ࢆ calf sex ratio 0.5  
yfr
fr
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Table 2. Baseline economic parameter values.
Parameters Description Value Reference/source 
pˆ  meat price 75 (NOK/kg) Olaussen and Mysterud (2012) 
qc hunting fee calf 210 (NOK/animal) Directorate for Nature 
Management 
qyf hunting fee yearling female 350 (NOK/animal) Directorate for Nature 
Management 
qym hunting fee yearling male 350 (NOK/animal) Directorate for Nature 
Management 
qf hunting fee female 350 (NOK/animal) Directorate for Nature 
Management 
qm hunting fee male 350 (NOK/animal) Directorate for Nature 
Management 
ș catchability coefficient 0.0001 (1/hunting day) Calibrated 
dc crop damage cost calves 175 (NOK/animal) Olaussen and Mysterud (2012) 
dyf crop damage cost yearling female 295 (NOK/animal) Olaussen and Mysterud (2012) 
dym crop damage cost yearling male 338 (NOK/animal) Olaussen and Mysterud (2012) 
df crop damage cost adult female 393 (NOK/animal) Olaussen and Mysterud (2012) 
dm crop damage cost adult male 532 (NOK/animal) Olaussen and Mysterud (2012) 
z recreational value 50 (NOK/day) Thorvaldsen et al. (2010) 
G  discount rate 0  
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Table 3. Steady state harvest rates and populations. Recreational value not included. ch , yfh ,
ymh  , fh , and mh  are harvest rates for calves, female yearlings, male yearlings, adult females 
and adult males, respectively. H  is total harvest (in number of animals) and cX , yfX , ymX ,
fX , and mX  are population sizes (in number of animals) of calves, female yearlings, male 
yearlings, adult females and adult males, respectively. X  is total population size. 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 
hc 0.20 0.19 0.18 0 0.18 
hyf 0 0 0 0 0.18 
hym 0 0 0 0 0.18 
hf 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.21 0.18 
hm 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.18 
H 1,060 1,088 1,096 951 732 
Xc 1,651 1,717 1,799 1,632 1,165 
Xyf 494 520 555 612 360 
Xym 494 520 555 612 360 
Xf 2,158 2,449 3,042 2,097 1,165 
Xm 740 778 830 916 1,102 
X 5,532 5,984 6,780 5,869 4,151 
Case 1: Baseline parameter values. Maximizing meat value minus grazing damage. Both constraints  
(12) and (13) included, and (13) with 0.55ym mh h  .
Case 2: As Case 1, but meat price increased by 50 % 
Case 3: As Case 1, but maximizing meat value only 
Case 4: As Case 1, but excluding the female – calf constraint (12) 
Case 5: Uniform harvest pattern. Maximizing meat value minus grazing damage 
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Table 4. Steady state landowner yearly cost and benefit (in 1,000 NOK).  
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4  Case 5
Meat value (V) 4,071  6,477 4,303 4,521 2,620
Crop damage (D) 1,843 2,006 2,303 1,984 1,476
Net benefit (R=V-D) 2,228 4,472 2,000 2,537 1,144
Net benefit per total 
hunted animal (R/H) 
2.102 4.108 1.825 2.667 1.563
Net benefit per total 
living animal (R/X) 
0.403 0.747 0.295 0.432 0.276
Case 1: Baseline parameter values. Maximizing meat value minus grazing damage. Both constraints 
(12) and (13) included, and (13) with 0.55ym mh h  .
Case 2: As Case 1, but meat price increased by 50 % 
Case 3: As Case 1, but maximizing meat value only 
Case 4: As Case 1, but excluding the female – calf constraint (12) 
Case 5: Uniform harvest pattern. Maximizing meat value minus grazing damage 
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Figure 1. Number of harvested red deer per 10 km2 in Norwegian municipalities in 1970 
(left) and 2009 (right). The figure illustrates both the change in population density and 
geographical distribution. Source: Statistics Norway. 
Figure 2. Dynamic harvest pattern Case 1. Harvesting rates h and time (years). Harvest rates 
of both male and female yearlings are zero all the time. 
Figure 3. Contour plots showing how different levels of landowner net benefit, meat hunting 
value minus grazing damage ( )V D (1,000NOK) relates to variation in harvest rates of adult 
males ( mh ) and adult females ( fh ). The left and right panel illustrates the conditions described 
in Case 1 and Case 4 respectively.The optimal steady state is identified with dots in both 
panels. The numbers along the level curves indicate net economic benefit (in 1,000 NOK), 
and the distance between two adjacent curves is 1 mill. NOK. Note the different scaling of the 
two panels. 
Figure 4. Dynamic harvest pattern when recreational value is included. 50z  (NOK/hunting
day). Other parameter values and constraints as in Case 1. Harvesting rates and time (years). 
Harvest rates of both adult males and yearlings are kept constant at 0.55. 
25
Figure 1  
26

Figure 2










Case 1 Case 4 

Figure 3 



5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
h
hc
hyf
hym
hf
hm
hm
h f
0.11 0.22 0.33 0.44 0.55
0.08
0.15
2,000
1,000
0
hm
h f
0.11 0.22 0.33 0.44 0.55
0.08
0.16
0.24
0.32
0.4
2,000
1,000
0
27



















Figure 4 












0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
t
h
hc hyf hym hf hm
28
Supplement section 
The Lagrangian of the problem of maximizing the present value benefit when only meat 
hunting value is included given the biological constraints plus constraints (12) and (13) may 
be written as 
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0tJ ! , 0tK ! , 0tO ! , 0tP !  are the shadow prices of the calf population constraint (1), female 
yearling constraint (2), adult female constraint (4) and adult male population constraint (7), 
respectively. 0tZ t is the shadow price of the female – calf harvesting restriction (12),  and 
0t] t and 0tF ! are the shadow prices of the adult male and male yearlings harvesting 
restrictions (13). Notice that the population constraint shadow prices, in contrast to the two 
harvesting constraints (12) and (13), always will be strictly positive because these constraints 
always bind (Kuhn-Tucker theorem). 
The first-order necessary control conditions of this maximizing problem are stated with the 
actual complementary slackness conditions and where the possibility for keeping each of the 
stages unexploited is considered while harvesting whole subpopulations are not considered as 
a possible option. These control conditions with , 0i tX ! ( , , , ,i c yf ym f m ) read then:  
(A1)  
,
, 1 1 0c c t c t
c
t
t
L X p s
h
UK \ UZ w    dw  ; ,0 1c thd  ,
(A2)  , 1
,
0yf t yf t yf
yf t
L X p s
h
UO w   dw ; ,0 1yf thd  ,
(A3)  , 1
,
0ym t ym t ym
ym t
L X p s
h
UP w   dw ; ,0 1ym thd  ,
(A4)  , 1 1 ,
,
0; 0 1f t f t f t f t
f t
L X p s h
h
UO UZ w    d d w
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and
(A5) , 1 1 ,
,
( / ) 0m t m t m t m t
m t
L X p s X
h
UP U[ w    dw ; ,0 1m thd  .
The portfolio conditions ,/ 0i tL Xw w   ( , , ,i c yf f m ) are rather messy and are not stated 
here.
Condition (A1) says that calf harvest should take up to the point where marginal harvest value 
is equal to, or below, the cost in term of reduced yearling growth of both categories evaluated 
at their shadow prices while also taking the discounting into account. The female - calf 
harvesting restriction shadow price is also included in this condition. When this condition 
holds as an inequality, the marginal benefit is below its marginal cost and harvesting of this 
stage is thus not profitable, , 0c th  . In a similar manner, condition (A2) and (A3) indicate 
that harvesting of the yearling female (male) category should take place up to the point where 
the marginal benefit is equal to, or below, the cost in terms of reduced population of adult 
females (males). The female and male adult conditions (A4) and (A5), respectively, can be 
given a similar interpretations, but the shadow cost of the female - calf harvesting constraint is 
included in the female condition (A4) while the shadow cost of the male harvesting rate is 
included in condition (A5).  
These first order control conditions together the portfolio conditions and the biological 
constraints comprise a complex dynamic system. It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to 
assess the dynamics analytically. However, based on the control conditions, it is possible to 
draw some important conclusions about the harvesting composition. To see this, we look 
away from the constraints (12) and (13). The above conditions are then simplified to: 
(A1’) , 1
,
( ) 0c t cc
c
t
t
L X p s
h
UK \w   dw  ; ,0 1c thd  ,
(A2’) , 1
,
( ) 0yf t yf t yf
yf t
L X p s
h
UO w   dw ; ,0 1yf thd  ,
(A3’) , 1
,
( ) 0yf t ym t ym
ym t
L X p s
h
UP w   dw ; ,0 1ym thd  ,
(A4’) , 1 ,
,
( ) 0; 0 1f t f t f f t
f t
L X p s h
h
UO w   d d w
and
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(A5’) , 1
,
( ) 0m t m t m
m t
L X p s
h
UP w   dw ; ,0 1m thd  .
From these conditions it is straightforward to find that harvesting female yearlings and 
females at the same time cannot represent a possible optimal policy. To see this, assume first 
that female yearling harvest is optimal. (A2’) (with , 0yf tX ! ) holds then as 1yf t yfp sUO  . In 
a similar manner, assume next that female harvest is optimal. With , 0f tX ! , (A4’) then reads 
1f t fp sUO  . Combining these two equation yields then / /yf yf f fp s p s . As only 
parameters are included here, this equation holds only by accident, Therefore, harvesting both 
these two stages at the same time cannot represent an optimal solution when the constraints 
(12) and (13) are not binding and when the harvest recreation value is not included. When 
combining (A3’) and (A5’) we can draw a similar type of conclusion; that is, harvesting male 
yearlings and males at the same time is not in accordance with the optimality conditions. In 
the main text (section 5.1) more discussions based on (A1’) – (A5’) are found. For example, 
harvesting female yearlings together with zero adult female harvesting yields 
/ /yf yf f fp s p s! , which represents a contradiction due to the structure of the parameter 
values.
When including grazing damage, , , , , ,t c c t fy fy t my my t f f t m m tD d X d X d X d X d X     , but still 
not including the recreational hunting value, the landowner problem is to 
, , , , ,, , , , 0
max ( )
c t fy t my t f t m t
t
t
t th h h h h t
V DU f
 
¦ , again subject to the biological growth equations (1), (2), (4) and 
(7) together with constraints (12) and (13). It is easily recognized that the control conditions 
of this problem will be similar to that of (A1) – (A5) because the harvest rates are not includet 
in the tD expression; that is, the damage occurs before the hunting. 
When the recreational value also is included, the problem is to maximize
^
  
, , , , , , , , ,
0 0
, , , , , , , , , ,
( ) (1 ) / )
( ) / }
t t
t t t c c t c t yf yf t ym ym t yf t f f t t m m t m t
t t
c c t fy fy t my my t f f t m m t c t yf t ym t f t m t
V D B p h X p h p h X p h X p h X
d X d X d X d X d X z h h h h h
U U \ \
T
f f
  
ª º       ¬ ¼
         
¦ ¦
to the same constraints as above. 
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The first-order necessary control conditions with , 0i tX ! ( , , , ,i c yf ym f m ) read now: 
(A1’’)  , , 1 1
,
/ 0c c t t c t
c t
c t
L X p z X s
h
T UK \ UZ w     dw  ; ,0 1c thd  ,
(A2’’)  , , 1
,
/ 0yf t yf yf t t yf
yf t
L X p z X s
h
T UO w    dw ; ,0 1yf thd  ,
(A3’’)  , , 1
,
/ (1 ) 0ym t ym yf t t ym
ym t
L X p z X s
h
\ \ T UP w     dw ; ,0 1ym thd  ,
(A4’’)  , , 1 1 ,
,
/ 0; 0 1f t f f t t f t f t
f t
L X p z X s h
h
T UO UZ w     d d w
and
(A5’’) , , 1 1 ,
,
( / / ) 0m t m m t t m t m t
m t
L X p z X s X
h
T UP U[ w     dw ; ,0 1m thd  .
The important difference is now that the population sizes are included in these control 
conditions.
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Chapter 4 
Sustainable production and the ambiguous effect of discounting 
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